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Between dependence and deprivation: the interlocking nature of land alienation in Tanzania 
 
Abstract: 
Studies of accumulation by dispossession in the Global South tend to focus on individual sectors, e.g. large-
scale agriculture or conservation. Yet smallholder farmers and pastoralists are not affected by one process 
in isolation, but by multiple processes of land alienation. Drawing on the case of Tanzania, we illustrate the 
analytical purchase of a comprehensive examination of dynamics of land alienation across multiple sectors. 
To begin with, processes of land alienation through investments in agriculture, mining, conservation and 
tourism dovetail with a growing social differentiation and class formation. These dynamics generate 
unequal patterns of land deprivation and accumulation that evolve in a context of continued land 
dependency by the vast majority of the rural population. Consequently, land alienation engenders 
responses by individuals and communities seeking to maintain control over their means of production. 
These responses include migration, land tenure formalization and land transactions, and in turn propagate 
across multiple localities and scales, interlocking with and further reinforcing the effects of land alienation. 
On the whole, localized processes of primitive accumulation contribute to a scramble for land in the 
aggregate, providing justifications for policies that further drive land alienation. 
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It appears that Tanzania is now facing a potential crisis of internal displacement in which 
people are shunted from place to place as valuable natural resources are appropriated from 
communities for conservation, commerce, and increasingly both together (Igoe & Croucher, 
2007, p. 553). 
There has been significant attention to the so-called African land rush (Hall, Scoones, & Tsikata, 2015; 
Scoones et al., 2013; Wolford et al., 2013), that is, the surge of foreign agricultural investments in Africa 
that started in the early 2000s. Many see Tanzania as an ideal country for large-scale agricultural land 
investments due to its record of liberal economic reforms and high growth rates in the last two decades. 
Tanzania’s government has actively embraced this international interest in its land through the introduction 
of investment-friendly policies and institutions. The Tanzania Investment Centre was created in 1997 to 
facilitate foreign (and domestic) investments in, among other things, land. Several attempts were 
undertaken at creating a land bank of demarcated, titled and investment-ready tracts of land with 
agricultural potential. In 2009, the Government of Tanzania launched the ‘Kilimo Kwanza’ - or ‘Agriculture 
First’ - initiative aiming to modernize the agricultural sector through public and private investments. Shortly 
thereafter, Tanzania’s president at the time - Jakaya Kikwete - launched the Southern Agricultural Growth 
Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) initiative at the 2010 World Economic Forum Africa summit. In the SAGCOT 
investment blueprint, Kikwete asserted the official and widely circulated government position that 
‘Tanzania has immense opportunities for agricultural development. There are 44 million hectares of arable 
land, only 24 percent of which is being utilized. … [T]he country’s huge agricultural potential remains 
unutilized’ (SAGCOT, 2011).  
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This classic narrative of ‘unused land’ also circulates in other parts of the African continent and dovetails 
with a discourse of neoliberal economic development and growth through land tenure formalization, 
modernization and commercialization of agriculture and animal husbandry (Geisler, 2012; Lunstrum, 2016; 
Nalepa, Short Gianotti, & Bauer, 2017). However, the narrative is at odds with continual reports of land 
conflicts across Tanzania. Drivers of such conflicts are many and include stalled or entirely failed land deals 
in large-scale agriculture, growth in human and livestock populations, patterns of displacement and 
migration, various conservation and tourism initiatives, infrastructure development, domestic land 
acquisition for speculation and cultivation, land tenure formalization and tree-planting initiatives, mining 
and so forth. Indeed, against official narratives of ‘unused land’, government authorities have threatened 
land owners of large estates with expropriation, accusing them of not properly ‘developing’ the land, calling 
for their property to be given back to poor or landless farmers in light of widespread land conflicts across 
the country (Guardian, 2016b; DailyNews, 2013). The narrative of ‘unused land’ is also questionable in light 
of growing concerns raised by Tanzania’s environmental-conservation complex (see Brockington, 2006) 
over an allegedly growing number of incursions by pastoralists into national parks and game reserves 
(Shekighenda, 2016; MNRT, 2016). 
In this article1, we go beyond exclusive attention to the agriculturally driven African land rush. Instead, we 
create an overview of the totality of land alienation processes in Tanzania by focusing on investments in 
agriculture, mining, conservation and tourism. Given their mutual reinforcement, these different processes 
should not be studied in isolation (Lunstrum, Bose, & Zalik, 2016; Hall, Hirsch, & Li, 2011; Hunsberger et al., 
2017). We show how land alienation processes take place in a context of continued land dependency by 
                                                          
1 This article is based on an extensive reading and analysis of relevant literature, decades of cumulative research experience on land 
issues and years of field presence in rural areas across several of Tanzania’s regions, including Dodoma, Iringa, Manyara, Mbeya, 
Mtwara, Lindi, Kigoma, Arusha and Ruvuma. 
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Tanzania’s rural population and how these processes are reinforced by a growing social differentiation and 
class formation. We also show how rural people respond to land alienation and dispossession to maintain 
their means of production, such as through migration, land tenure formalization and land transaction, and 
how these responses, in turn, further reinforce the effects of land alienation. We provide important 
evidence to policy debates about land in Tanzania and elsewhere, thereby countering paradoxical claims 
over ‘unused’ or ‘undeveloped’ land amidst growing pressures on rural livelihoods by various drivers of land 
alienation. 
AGRARIAN CHANGE AND LAND ALIENATION  
Our contribution speaks to debates on agrarian change (Bernstein, 1977; Moyo, 2008; Li, 2014) and 
primitive accumulation, what Marx famously coined a ‘historical process of divorcing the producer from the 
means of production’ and enabling the appropriation of this freed labour for capitalist production (Marx, 
1976, p. 875). David Harvey and many scholars after him built on this historical and still ongoing process of 
land enclosures in demonstrating how capitalism continues expanding its reach, creating new markets and 
property regimes, and changing social relations in the process of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 
2003; Glassman, 2006; Hall, 2013). 
Different forms of land alienation 
Accumulation by rural dispossession takes many forms. It requires neither changes in formal property rights 
nor physical land grabbing by ‘extra-economic means’ (Akram-Lodhi, 2007; Hall, 2013). Rather, 
dispossession can be the result of more subtle processes of land control grabbing (Margulis, McKeon, & 
Borras Jr, 2013; Peluso & Lund, 2011) whereby access to use land for certain purposes is restricted. 
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Conservation interventions, commodification of seeds2, contract farming, juridical capture, land use 
planning and demarcation, and land transactions can all result in land control grabbing (Bluwstein & Lund, 
2018; Stein & Cunningham, 2017; Borras Jr, & Franco, 2012; Huggins, 2014; Oya, 2012; Prudham, 2007). 
While none of these processes necessarily imply formal challenges to local land rights, they can have an 
effect similar to implying the loss of land altogether (Cáceres, 2015). Furthermore, accumulation by 
dispossession does not only involve the expropriation of land into private hands. It can also involve the 
transferral of customary or communal land ownership into the public domain (e.g. a national park), if third 
party interests (such as conservation NGOs or tourism investors) can profit via this act of enclosure (Kelly, 
2011). 
Accumulation by dispossession can also involve the appropriation of labour of those who lose their land-
based means of production. However, in the Global South and specifically in the Tanzanian context the 
appropriation of surplus labour through proletarianization - what could be called labour grabbing (Stein & 
Cunningham, 2017) - is limited to informal sectors where casual labour under highly exploitative 
arrangements is common (Mueller, 2011). Current patterns of land appropriation create only few 
formalized wage-labour opportunities (Meagher, 2016). Put differently, there may be no ‘proletarian 
future’ for landless or land-deprived people in many parts across the Global South (Li, 2011, p. 296). Thus, 
many smallholders join the ranks of a growing landless labour reserve (in the Marxian sense), that is, they 
are rendered a surplus population without a prospect for employment (Li, 2010; Ferguson, 2013; Peters, 
2013). Shivji (2009) conceptualizes this process of accumulation by dispossession in the Tanzanian context 
as a ‘disarticulated’ accumulation, introduced through colonial or neoliberal regimes, and perpetuated by 
                                                          
2 ’Tanzanian farmers are facing heavy prison sentences if they continue their traditional seed exchange’ 
http://www.mo.be/en/analysis/tanzanian-farmers-are-facing-heavy-prison-sentences-if-they-continue-their-
traditional-seed  
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the state’s disregard for the peasantry. Indeed, Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation rests on the 
integration of the new labour force into circuits of capitalist production, which is a deeply transformative 
process (Wood, 2002; Glassman 2006). In Tanzania, this process is ongoing and incomplete. Moreover, 
accumulation and dispossession are entangled with patterns of internal class formation, social 
differentiation and social reproduction (Mueller, 2011; Greco, 2015; Chung, 2017). In the course of various 
processes of land (control) and labour grabbing, societies become stratified into (predominantly male) 
landlords and owners of large livestock herds who can extract rents and surplus labour, and land-deprived 
farmers (especially women) and impoverished pastoralists who must offer their labour, struggling to 
survive. These agrarian transformations are not new to Tanzania (e.g. see Shao, 1986; von Freyhold, 1979; 
Iliffe, 1979) and continue even when recent foreign-led large-scale land deals stall, or entirely fail to 
materialize (Oya, 2013; Hall, 2013).  
In response to the growing land squeeze underpinned by different forms of land (control) or labour 
grabbing, rural people turn to migration, or occupation of land enclosed as protected area (Charnley, 1997; 
Moyo & Yeros, 2005; Hall, Hirsch, & Li, 2011; Hall, 2013). Migration can create new forms of exclusion and 
increase land pressure elsewhere in the country where the arrival of migrants may contribute to land 
tenure formalization, as residents seek to protect their land against newcomers, whom they may be 
inclined to evict. Hall, Hirsch, and Li (2011) refer to this interlocking nature of different processes of land 
alienation as primitive accumulation ‘from below’. Another response in the face of land alienation is 
livelihood diversification (Mueller, 2011; Hodgson, 2001). Socio-economic diversification can be 
underpinned by production declines in agriculture or livestock husbandry (Ponte, 2001; McCabe, Leslie, & 
DeLuca, 2010) and tends to increase social differentiation and to promote informal sectors of wage labour 
(Peters, 2004; Bryceson, 2002; Lyimo, 2014).  
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Tanzania, a land-dependent nation 
Agriculture in Tanzania can be broadly characterised by a stagnant agricultural labour productivity 
(Korotayev & Zinkina, 2015), and since the 1990s a growing number of studies have reported a declining 
soil fertility (Ponte, 2001; Baijukya et al., 2005; Lindberg, 1996; Kangalawe, Christiansson, & Östberg, 2008; 
Snyder 1996). This development was initiated by ill-conceived and coercive resettlement policies of the 
1970s (villagization) that led to agricultural intensification (Shao, 1986; Kjekshus, 1977). It was compounded 
by structural adjustment and liberalization policies of the 1980s and 1990s, which deprived a growing 
number of smallholders of agricultural inputs necessary to maintain or increase production (Bryceson, 
2002). Lokina et al. (2011) report that with the exception of rice, average yields of maize, sorghum and 
beans – key food staples – declined in the 2000s, and total output could be stabilized only through 
agricultural area expansion. FAO highlights that ‘with the exception of rice, the country has . . . remained a 
net importer of food staples during the period 2007-2013’. FAO attests that Tanzania has ‘one of the lowest 
levels of productivity in sub-Saharan Africa’ due to a lack of irrigation, improved seeds and fertilizers (FAO, 
2014, p. 1). Coulson (2013) points out that the present growth in agricultural outputs (around 4 % per year) 
exceeds population growth (around 3 % per year), yet he is sceptical that this level of growth (which is 
largely based on agricultural area expansion) can be maintained in the future. The competition for farmland 
across many parts of Tanzania is therefore set to increase. 
Despite ongoing processes of deagrarianization or depeasantization (Bryceson, 2002) that echo social 
differentiation and socio-economic diversification, we contend that Tanzania’s growing peasantry remains 
highly dependent on land and environment. A majority of income for rural livelihoods across sub-Saharan 
Africa and specifically in Tanzania is sourced from agriculture, livestock, environmental resources (forest 
and non-forest) or casual labour on other people’s farms. Land and environmental dependency cuts across 
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wealth, gender and education, although poorer, less-educated and female-headed households tend to be 
more dependent (Angelsen et al., 2014; Lund & Treue, 2008). Tanzania’s population is expected to reach 
137 million in 2050, having already grown from 10 to 53 million people in 1960-2015 (Figure 1)3. While 
Tanzania has seen substantial macroeconomic growth of late, the country remains a predominantly 
agriculture-based smallholder economy (Korotayev & Zinkina, 2015). Industrialization has been limited and 
uneven, and economic growth has not resulted in greatly expanded opportunities for formal employment 
(Wuyts & Kilama, 2016; Gray, 2013). While rural-urban migration will continue to shift the Tanzanian 
demographic landscape in the coming decades, in absolute terms more people will likely have to live off the 
land in the future. In the absence of mass industries that provide employment opportunities (Wuyts & 
Kilama, 2016), urbanization and deagrarianization will not change the fact that land and land-based 
resources will remain the main means of (re)production for tens of millions of smallholders in the 
foreseeable future (see also Moyo & Yeros, 2005; Hall, Hirsch, & Li, 2011). 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Figure 1: Population growth in Tanzania (recorded until 2015, estimated beyond 2015, source: World Bank 
Health, Nutrition and Population Statistics) 
To further contextualize Tanzanian dynamics of agrarian change and land alienation, we present findings 
from two studies conducted across Tanzania by some of the authors of this article. The research project 
“Transformations in Poverty and Property Rights in Rural Tanzania”4 randomly sampled 1,600 households in 
33 villages between 2010 and 2016, yielding average rates of landlessness (understood as owning 1 acre of 
land or less per household) from 9.4 to 22.2 % across the regions Kigoma, Mbeya/Songwe, Manyara and 
                                                          
3 World Bank Health Nutrition and Population Statistics, accessed 2017.04.27 
4 https://www.udsm.ac.tz/node/492  
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Dodoma. This range illustrates the geographically uneven effects of different drivers of land alienation as 
they intersect with population density and growth, and local land markets. Another, larger dataset, 
collected under the auspices of a research project on rural livelihoods and conservation5, illustrates that 
landlessness is also thoroughly gendered. Based on a sample of 945 female- and 1,924 male-headed 
households interviewed in 2014-15 across the regions Arusha, Manyara, Ruvuma and Lindi, female-headed 
households evince a fourfold prevalence in being landless (following the same definition as above). In the 
following sections we illustrate how in the context of continued rural land dependency, and an uneven and 
gendered geography of landlessness, different drivers of land alienation interlock and jointly advance an 
ongoing and yet incomplete primitive accumulation.  
GOVERNANCE OF LAND IN TANZANIA 
From colonial rule Tanzania inherited a system of state-sanctioned land alienation through land laws (URT, 
1994). From a legal perspective, all land in Tanzania is public land, vested in the president as trustee for and 
on behalf of all Tanzanian citizens. Three overarching land categories are defined to govern land use and 
land control: reserved land, village land and general land. General land includes urban areas and large-scale 
investments. It falls directly under the Commissioner for Lands, and is defined in Land Act No. 4 as ’all 
public land which is not reserved land or village land, and includes unoccupied or unused village land’ (URT 
1999, p. 10, our emphasis). General land is therefore an ambiguous residual land category for lands that 
either are not clearly categorized otherwise (Sundet, 2005), or can be claimed as ‘unused’, ‘unoccupied’, 
‘undeveloped’, etc. Such claims are enabled by the lack of a national cadastre and inaccurate and disputed 
                                                          
5 https://www.ucl.ac.uk/pima/  
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records of village and reserved land boundaries, and they are generally underpinned by unequal power 
relations that render migrants, women and pastoralists particularly vulnerable (Odgaard, 2002). 
Reserved land is governed by various statutory bodies. Forest reserves are for example governed by the 
Tanzanian Forest Service in accordance with the Forest Act 2002. The vast majority of reserved land in 
Tanzania is set aside for conservation and tourism purposes. Village land is governed by democratically 
elected village councils under the Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999. The act formally recognizes customary 
land rights and has legal provisions to prevent discrimination against women and vulnerable groups. 
Smallholders are encouraged to further secure their land rights by obtaining certificates of customary rights 
of occupancy (CCROs), and male-headed households are encouraged to register land titles jointly with their 
wives (Odgaard, 2006), yet progress towards more equitable land registration is slow (Pedersen, 2015). For 
instance, only 3.4% and 5.8% of issued CCROs in Babati and Bariadi Districts were jointly received by a man 
and his wife (URT, 2010). Preliminary results from a 2014-2016 study show similar trends across the 
districts Chamwino, Kongwa and Kasulu. On average, 11.4% of CCROs were held jointly by a man and a 
woman (Askew & Odgaard, in review). Through CCROs, rural people are expected to avoid land disputes, 
increase agricultural productivity, and become integrated in the formal banking sector, with the CCRO 
acting as collateral to receive a loan. CCROs are technically not to be issued before the village has obtained 
a certificate of village land (CVL) from the Commissioner of Lands, which is conditioned upon the successful 
surveying and demarcating of village boundaries, an approved village land use plan (VLUP) and a village 
registry (Stein et al., 2016)6.  
                                                          
6 According to the 2016 National Land Policy draft, out of roughly 12,500 villages (nobody really knows the exact 
number), 80 % have their boundaries surveyed and 13.1 % have a village land use plan (URT, 2016a). 
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Village land use planning (VLUP) has attained a prominent role in land tenure formalization policies that 
aim to identify ‘freely available’ and ‘unoccupied’ village land for large-scale agricultural investment or 
community-based conservation. VLUP exercises invite several actors to influence the process: they are 
sometimes facilitated by outsiders interested to acquire land, and they must be reviewed by district land 
and planning officers before approval by the National Land Use Planning Commission is sought (Walwa, 
2017). While ostensibly aimed at secure land rights and empowerment for village communities, VLUP 
processes have, in practice, resulted in physical or economic displacement and reinforced the very same 
farmer-herder conflicts that they proclaim to mitigate (Walwa, 2017). VLUP processes have been observed 
to enable a shift of authority into the hands of political-bureaucratic and economic elites, and have 
furthered land alienation at the expense of both farmers and pastoralists in favour of investments in 
commercial agriculture, conservation and tourism (Stein & Cunningham, 2017; Greco, 2016; Maganga et al., 
2016). Farmers and pastoralists who are deemed migrants are particularly vulnerable to be rendered 
landless through VLUP exercises that do not recognize their residency in the village (Walwa, 2017; 
Bluwstein, 2017). Pastoralists with recognized claims are also vulnerable in land use planning exercises that 
fragment rangelands (Goldman & Riosmena, 2013), or result in limitations of livestock mobility to particular 
districts or villages (usually through branding of livestock) and/or forced sales of ‘excess cattle’ (URT, 
2013b, p. 193). The practice of land use planning therefore challenges provisions under the Land Acts that 
aim to protect people’s customary land rights by recognizing their claims to village land vis-à-vis external 
investors, even when smallholders do not have a title or other forms of registration. When village land is 
acquired by outsiders under a granted right of occupancy that is governed by statutory law, local people’s 
customary land rights and land claims can be overridden, because ‘unequal power relations lead to unequal 
recognition of customary and statutory law’ (Locher, 2016, p. 393).  
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Given the evidence so far, it is therefore not surprising that the promises of land tenure formalization have 
been elusive, even in cases of counter-mapping of communal resources by local people (Maganga et al., 
2016; Stein et al., 2016; Hodgson & Schroeder, 2002). Importantly, once land has been identified for 
investment through village land use planning exercises, the land undergoes a legal shift out of village land 
status and village control to general land status and control by Tanzanian Investment Centre (TIC). TIC 
secures a Certificate of Occupancy for the land and in turn subleases it to the investor for up to 99 years. 
Consequently, power over land control shifts from village to TIC (central government), regional authorities 
and foreign investors, and it remains in these hands even if the investment does not materialize. A draft of 
the 2016 National Land Policy proposes to limit leases to 33 years (URT, 2016a, p. 41) but suggests to allow 
investors to purchase ‘Unit Titles’ in village lands that would further facilitate land alienation through highly 
capitalized investment (URT, 2016a, p. 40-1). Therefore, we contend that dispossession by formalization 
continues to be inscribed in official land policies from the outset, rather than being an unintended 
outcome. 
Having situated the dynamics of agrarian change in the contemporary context of land governance through 
land use planning and land formalization in Tanzania, we now present evidence of the multiple drivers of 
land alienation, starting with investments in commercial agriculture, continuing with mining and finishing 
with conservation. 
INVESTMENTS IN COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE 
Table 1 provides a historical overview of land alienation through commercial agriculture and ranching. The 
statistics reflect a poor state of information, showing an inconsistent and at times conflicting picture (URT, 
1994; Sulle, 2015). Official data suggests that 1.5 % of Tanzania’s terrestrial land is under commercial large-
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scale investments (>100 ha) and 6.6 % under medium-scale farming (5-100 ha, see Table 1). Locher & Sulle 
(2014) estimated around 10,000 km2 of new land deals above 200 ha by foreign investors7 for agricultural 
production8 at the height of the land rush by the end of 2012. Locher and Sulle emphasize that only ten 
deals with a total area of 1,450 km2 can be considered concluded. Focusing on agro-fuel investments since 
2003, Abdallah et al. (2014) identified 32 mostly foreign investors that had requested a total of 11,000 km2 
of land above 2,000 ha. Yet only nine investors acquired land, totalling 2,000 km2. A majority have gone 
bankrupt or have shifted to food production and are still struggling to become operational. 
The recently updated Land Matrix database covers recent deals (‘contract size’) amounting to 2,725 km2, 
considerably less than initially reported (Table 1). These deals correlate geographically with the SAGCOT 
(Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania) designation (Figure 2). The SAGCOT initiative envisages 
the development of 350,000 ha of land into large-scale agriculture and 330,000 ha into outgrower schemes 
within the corridor (SAGCOT, 2011; NewAlliance, 2014). This would entail the re-categorization of village 
into general land, which is a declared objective of the SAGCOT initiative. In a 2012 presentation aimed to 
advertise the SAGCOT initiative to potential investors, the Minister of Lands, Housing and Human 
Settlement indicated that around 9,000 km2 of village land in the SAGCOT corridor had already been 
identified (‘freed up’) for potential investments based on a review of village land use plans (MLHS, 2012). 
[Table 1 here] 
Table 1: Land under alienation through commercial agriculture in Tanzania 
 
                                                          
7 Or in collaboration between foreign and domestic investors. 
8 Including food, biofuels, timber plantations, and forestry carbon credits. 
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[FIGURE 2 here] 
Figure 2: SAGCOT (2011) and land deals for large-scale agriculture in Tanzania (Landmatrix, 2016) 
 
In addition to foreign-led investments, smaller land deals and leases by domestic investors for investments 
in agriculture or forestry are taking place in different parts of the country (Olwig, et al. 2015). In a 
commissioned study for the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlement, the University of Dar es 
Salaam evaluated agricultural land-holdings (>50 acres) in mainland Tanzania in 2013 (URT, 2013a). Out of a 
purposive sample of 691 farms covering 3,651 km2 across Tanzania, ownership of 666 farms could be 
determined. Tanzanian individuals owned by far the most farms (455), followed by Tanzanian companies 
(72). However, given the differences in average farm area between domestic and foreign property owners, 
proportionately few foreign individuals and companies (45 out of 666) owned more than a quarter of all 
sampled land area (Table 2).  
[TABLE 2 here] 
Table 2: Farm ownership and size, compiled based on URT (2013a)  
 
Table 2 may already reflect a growing urban class of Tanzanian elites who drive investments in medium-
scale commercial agriculture, seeking to reinvest their wealth in land (Jayne et al., 2016). Official Tanzanian 
statistics indicate that 28 % of urban residents are engaged in agricultural activities (NBS, 2014). Jayne et al. 
(2016) report a rise in Tanzanian land ownership by urban households from 11.8 to 32.5 % of national 
landholdings in only five years from 2005 to 2010. Within the same period, urban households increased 
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their share of land from 17.2 to 78.9 % of landholdings of 20 ha or above (Jayne et al., 2016). This 
development disproportionally affects rural women in negative ways (Knapman et al., 2017), may 
‘exacerbate land scarcity in rural areas’ (Jayne et al., 2016, p. 197), and may also reconfigure social relations 
of property and labour. Land accumulation for production and speculation by urban elites is in some cases 
followed by the subsequent leasing of this land to the previous owners – often poor smallholders who 
cannot afford to cultivate their own land – who now find themselves as tenants working for the new 
landlords or co-owners. These gendered dynamics of class formation and labour grabbing tempted The 
Economist to blame the urban elites for ‘Africa’s real land grab’ (Economist, 2016). 
To conclude, attempted, successful and failed investments in large-scale land deals for agribusiness may all 
contribute to land alienation. Land tenure reconfigurations for medium-scale cultivation and speculation 
without any involvement of foreign investment constitute another important process of land alienation in 
Tanzania that is underpinned by and produces new dynamics of class formation and social differentiation. 
Importantly, agricultural investments - foreign or domestic - that do not materialize and might be excluded 
from statistics, can have severe impacts on land access and control for both farmers and pastoralists. 
Overlapping claims to land and subsequent conflicts abound around investments that are initiated with 
little regard for local context, legal pluralism and locally specific and gendered power relations around 
access to land. Since land must be acquired by the investor relatively early in the process, processes of 
resettlement, evictions or fencing happen in advance of production. If the investment implementation is 
delayed or abandoned, land is alienated from smallholders even though nothing is being produced by the 
investor (Engström, 2013; Maganga et al., 2016; Stein & Cunningham, 2017).  




Mining has also increasingly affected land tenure in Tanzania in the past years. The government of Tanzania 
considers 90 % of the country’s terrestrial area (800,000 km2) as potentially having mining resources (URT, 
2015). Recent estimates suggest that 680,000 people are engaged in artisanal mining in Tanzania, and 
another 15,000 in large-scale mining (URT, 2015; Bryceson & Geenen, 2016). Although artisanal mining is 
dominated by men, local economies build around mining also attract women (Bryceson & Geenen, 2016). 
In the wake of the 1998 Mining Act, which strongly promoted foreign direct investment, Tanzania has 
experienced a mining boom, and gold has become a major export commodity (Bryceson & Jønsson, 2010; 
Schroeder, 2012). International mining companies’ large-scale investments and extraction methods are 
barely taxed by the Tanzanian state9, generate little employment, have led to displacement of hundreds of 
thousands of artisanal miners, and have polluted the environments of farmers and pastoralists living close 
to mines (Emel, Huber, & Makene, 2011; Kitula, 2006; Holterman, 2014; Schroeder, 2012; Magai & 
Márquez-Velázquez, 2011). Tanzanian mining laws are ambiguous and vest much power in the 
Commissioner of Mining, while villagers have little say in mining concession allocations (Lange, 2008). Once 
minerals are discovered, mining laws take precedence over land laws, challenging existing customary land 
rights of rural people (Pedersen & Jacob, 2017). At times, mining investors work with outdated maps, 
sweeping aside claims to land ownership and control by small-scale miners, pastoralists and farmers, and 
even entire villages (Kulindwa et al., 2003; Lange, 2008). The Geological Survey of Tanzania10 maps 482 
mines across the country, including 125 gold mines. According to the national mining cadastre, an 
                                                          
9 But see Pedersen & Jacob (2017) for the most recent changes to Tanzania’s mining legislation 
10 http://www.gmis-tanzania.com/ 
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estimated total area11 of almost 140,000 km2 (15 % of Tanzania’s terrestrial land area) is designated for 
prospect licenses for potential exploration (Figure 3).  
Where mining interests collide with conservation and tourism interests, these geographic and economic 
intersections can lead to further expansion of conservation on village lands to compensate for mining 
activities in protected areas, as the example of Selous Game Reserve illustrates. Uranium mining in Selous 
was permitted on condition that the UNESCO World Heritage Site should not be reduced. Consequently, 
boundary changes to excise the mining area from the reserve have been proposed to include land outside 
the game reserve to compensate the losses to mining12. In return for potentially highly hazardous activities, 
the mining company is expected to support anti-poaching operations in and around the game reserve 
(Tairo, 2014). These novel intersections and alliances between conservation and mining interests can jointly 
challenge local land and resource control.  
[Figure 3 here] 
Figure 3: Different mining concessions in Tanzania, overlaid with an incomplete selection of protected 
areas. Screenshot from FlexiCadastre. Accessed 2017.01.10 
CONSERVATION 
Tanzania’s colonial and post-colonial history is deeply intertwined with efforts to set aside land held in 
common as ‘wilderness’ areas for biodiversity conservation that would benefit tourism activities such as 
game viewing and hunting (Neumann, 1998). This fortress conservation approach (Brockington, 2002) was 
                                                          
11 Own estimate, based on http://portal.mem.go.tz/map/ 
12 interview with Ministry official, November, 2016. UNESCO decisions and documents available at 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/4814, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/199/documents/ 
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initiated towards the end of the 19th century by the German colonial occupation, continued under the 
British rule and after independence, and was supplemented by community-based conservation initiatives 
since the 1990s in the course of neoliberalization of conservation (Igoe & Brockington, 2007). These two 
paradigmatic regimes of conservationist land control have produced an extensive network of protected 
areas (Figure 4). Since the late 1990s conservation approaches in the Global South have morphed into what 
big international NGOs and their donors call landscape conservation13, a claim to vast territories spanning 
different conservation interventions and protected area categories, ecosystems and habitats, people, 
villages and communities (Clay, 2016; Bluwstein, in review). In the following we show how large parts of 
Tanzania’s territories are to different degrees taken out of local control and production through the 
advancement of different conservation regimes. 
Community-Based Forest Management 
The first community-based forest management (CBFM) schemes on village land were reserved in the 1990s 
and since then implementation has proceeded under donor financing (Lund et al., 2017). By 2012 a total of 
1,233 villages were involved in CBFM and the area of village land under reservation was estimated at 
23,667 km2 (URT, 2012b) 14. This estimate also includes CBFM areas in various planning stages (Lund et al., 
2017). In reality, the area where CBFM has changed smallholder’s access to land and land-based resources 
may thus be much smaller. Yet, conservation ‘work in progress’ may also imply ‘land alienation in progress’.  
Through CBFM, village councils are granted administrative powers to manage and benefit from forest 
reserves on village land, while the state can no longer exploit them and waives all royalties generated from 
them (Blomley & Iddi, 2009). However, with the reservation, village councils foreclose the possibility of 
                                                          
13 E.g., AWF, WCS, WWF, FZS, TNC, USAID 
14 We do not mention Joint Forest Management (JFM) here as it only applies to reserved forests under state authority 
(see Table 3). 
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changing land use away from it being a ‘forest’. Farming and settlements are banned, as is grazing in some 
areas. This change in property relations and land control implies that the forest bureaucracy gets a 
permanent say in determining the land use, while the village councils lose the right to independently 
change it (Sungusia & Lund, 2016). Yet, in terms of access to forest-based livelihoods, CBFM, in principle, 
enables villagers to exclude others, such as urban elites, from exploiting their forest areas. Villagers gain 
legal access to retain all benefits from the use of the forest under the constraint that it is managed in 
accordance with the Forest Act 2002. In practice, this access is curtailed by various other pieces of 
legislation and bureaucratic procedures (Sungusia & Lund, 2016). Thus, it took 20 years since the initiation 
of CBFM in Tanzania before the first larger volume of timber was harvested in a CBFM forest and 
substantial revenues started flowing  (Khatun et al., 2015).  
Formalization of villagers’ rights to access forests, but also the responsibility to maintain them, has led to 
restrictions, increased enforcement and policing of fellow villagers (Lund & Treue, 2008; Vyamana, 2009). 
This has constrained and criminalized the livelihoods of poor and forest-dependent smallholders while 
giving a small elite of village-level forest managers the possibility of benefiting from allowances and 
associated income opportunities (Lund & Saito-Jensen, 2013; Green & Lund, 2015). 
Wildlife Management Areas 
Since the early 2000s, around 20 Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) have been established on more than 
30,000 km2 of village land across Tanzania. This has happened under the auspices of the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism, supported by various international donors15, and several international conservation 
NGOs, most prominently WWF, AWF, WCS and FZS16. A WMA consists of a contiguous village land area set 
                                                          
15 E.g., USAID, Danida, GIZ, KfW, AFD, GEF/UNDP 
16 World Wildlife Fund, African Wildlife Foundation, Wildlife Conservation Society, Frankfurt Zoological Society 
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aside by several neighbouring villages for wildlife conservation purposes. Often, WMAs are established in 
areas that are believed to serve connectivity or corridor functions for the movement of wildlife between 
core protected areas (Goldman, 2009). In WMAs, agriculture, settlements and, in some places, livestock 
grazing are banned or heavily restricted through village land use planning. Many other land-dependent 
activities, such as production of charcoal or the collection of firewood or construction materials, are also 
restricted or banned altogether. In return, villages are promised revenues from tourism investors who are 
invited to operate in WMAs under a contractual agreement with the community-based organization (CBO). 
A CBO jointly with a board of trustees17 manage the WMA on behalf of the member villages. The land 
administration powers bestowed on village councils by the Local Government Act of 1982 and reinforced 
with the 1999 Village Land Act No. 5 are thereby handed over to these newly established and weakly 
accountable institutions, resulting in often overly restrictive land use and management plans that foreclose 
alternative land use in WMA territories into the future (Bluwstein, Moyo, & Kicheleri, 2016). CBOs are 
generally not willing to allow changes in WMA land use planning, and it is virtually impossible for dissenting 
communities or even entire villages to undo a WMA in practice, once it is established (Bluwstein & Lund, 
2018; Bluwstein, Moyo, & Kicheleri, 2016). WMAs thus erode the progressive features of land reforms 
inscribed in the Land Acts of 1999. 
In many instances, the implementation of WMAs has spurred land and boundary conflicts, evictions and 
displacement, despite the rhetoric of community-based participation and ownership. Restrictive WMA 
regimes tend to recentralize land and resource control with few employment opportunities in return 
(Benjaminsen et al., 2013; Green & Adams, 2014). Female-headed households are particularly vulnerable to 
WMA interventions, especially if they are poor (Homewood, Nielsen, & Keane, in review). Contrary to CBFM 
                                                          
17 That includes district government representatives  
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arrangements that allow village councils to protect village land against external interests and to keep 
revenues from resource use, in WMAs new actors - conservation NGOs, tourism investors and local 
economic and political elites - are invited to control village lands in the name of community-based 
conservation. This undermines elected village councils and leads to the emergence of new forms of 
authority over land control, while promoting elite capture of WMA benefits (Bluwstein, 2017).  
There are a few cases where local residents have chosen to create a WMA to protect their land rights 
against actual or perceived outsiders who may want to establish themselves in these villages (Bluwstein, in 
review). Often the ones excluded are landless migrants searching for land, farmers in need to expand their 
activities but lacking inputs to intensify production, or urban or rural elites looking for capital investment 
opportunities. These cases of exclusion, too, tend to contribute to the growing land pressure across the 
country when communities or entire villages succeed in taking land out of production or investment. 
National Parks and Game and Forest Reserves 
Most of Tanzania’s core protected areas (national parks, game and forest reserves) were initially declared 
many decades ago, often involving evictions (Brockington, Sachedina, & Scholfield, 2008; Sunseri, 2009). 
However, their protection status and territories have not remained stable, implying recurring incidences of 
physical and economic displacement (Brockington & Igoe, 2006). Displacement reconfigures the gendered 
intra-household dynamics in complex ways, in many instances creating new burdens for women, but to 
some extent also offering opportunities to renegotiate entrenched gender roles (Brockington, 2002). Many 
parks and reserves have consolidated or expanded their existing territories in the past decades, often 
animated by the landscape vision of conservation NGOs and their donors (Bluwstein, in review). With the 
introduction of GPS technology in the 2000s, several National Parks have resurveyed their boundaries, 
which led to new claims against adjacent villages (Boerstra, 2017; Sachedina, 2008). Calls to resettle rural 
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people or to relocate entire villages in order to ‘resolve’ protracted boundary conflicts with protected areas 
are common and continue until this day.18 
Similarly, forest reserves in Tanzania have been gazetted, expanded, diminished, or entirely degazetted 
over the past century since the German colonial period (Sunseri, 2009; Hurst, 2004). Furthermore, changing 
regulations and waxing and waning patterns of enforcement have implied that the role of forest reserves in 
rural livelihoods has been in constant flux. The forest reserve estate has grown throughout the post-
colonial period, especially  in the 1980s and 1990s (Hurst, 2004). Today, according to different sources, 
Tanzania features around 450-700 forest reserves (see Table 3). Since the formation of the state agency 
Tanzania Forest Service in 2010, there has been an increased emphasis on revenue generation from forest 
reserves, which has led to more enforcement and evictions, as well as to renewed efforts to re-establish 
firm reserve boundaries. Thus, rural people who in the past benefited from access to poorly defined, 
demarcated and enforced reserve boundaries now find themselves under increasing scrutiny and policing. 
Hunting concessions 
There are around 140 hunting blocks in Tanzania. A hunting block is neither a protected area nor a land 
category, but a concession to hunt in a bounded area inside a core protected area (Game Reserve, GR), a 
Game Controlled Area (GCA), an Open Area (OA) or a Wildlife Management Area (WMA). GCAs and OAs 
have overlapped with communal lands since their establishment during colonial rule. The Wildlife Division 
of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism can allocate a hunting block within a GCA or an OA, 
thereby challenging game viewing tourism activities on village lands that may have been established with 
the approval of village governments. The Wildlife Division favours professional hunting outfitters’ interests 
                                                          
18 E.g. nine villages adjacent to Ruaha National Park are to be „removed completely”. IPP Guardian, 2017.06.15 
http://www.ippmedia.com/en/news/act-environmental-degradation-samia-orders-dcs  
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against the interests of village governments because - unlike game viewing activities - hunting concessions 
directly fund the Ministry’s coffers, and rents can be captured directly by Ministry officials (Benjaminsen et 
al., 2013). However, OAs are not codified as a land category in land or wildlife laws. Similarly, many GCAs de 
jure also ceased to exist as a land category after the 2009 Wildlife Conservation Act declared that GCAs 
cannot overlap with village lands (URT 2009, §16(5)). Nonetheless, until this day the liminal category of 
GCAs - more so than of OAs - is used to assign hunting blocks against the will of village councils (Gardner, 
2016) or to impose restrictions on settlement and livestock keeping (URT, 2013b). GCAs and OAs continue 
to be invoked in official government and NGO reports and statistics (URT, 2013c; UNEP-WCMC, 2017). If 
villages are opposing the often highly restrictive hunting operations on their lands (Wright, 2016), the 
Wildlife Division might impose a false choice on village governments to either accept a restrictive WMA 
scheme or to see their land being reassigned as exclusive hunting grounds under a GCA or a GR regime, as 
the long-standing and ongoing conflict in Loliondo demonstrates (Gardner, 2016).  
Most hunting blocks are controlled by foreigners (MNRT, 2006), and some are directly linked to ultra-rich 
US or Arab oligarchs or Asian-Tanzanian nationals (Wright, 2016), whose wealth and exclusive access to 
government authorities can corrupt individuals at all levels of government down to elected village officials 
(Packer 2015). The US-based Friedkin Conservation Fund alone claims an area of 6.1 million acres (24,685 
km2) - 2.8 % of Tanzania’s terrestrial area - for conservation and tourism through exclusive hunting, game 
viewing and lodging19. Hunting concessions on village lands are often subleased to other hunting operators 
(Packer, 2015) or even to mining companies (Noe, 2013) without any say by the village governments, 
whose land is traded as a commodity between private investors for significant sums of money, with 
negligible compensation for the villages (Kisembo, 2012).  
                                                          
19 http://www.tgts.com/philanthropy/  
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In sum, foreign and domestic interests in tourism, wildlife and forest conservation constitute the major 
immediate driver of land tenure change and land alienation in Tanzania. By comparing the most 
authoritative yet incomplete and inaccurate sources, we conclude that around 42 % of Tanzania’s total 
terrestrial area is already enclosed for different forms of conservation (Table 3, Figure 4)20. Taking into 
account the widespread boundary uncertainties, overlapping claims and different data sources, we provide 
a range of 39.5-51.4 %.  
This estimate differs significantly from often-repeated official statistics about land distribution in Tanzania. 
A recent  draft of the National Land Policy, for instance, gives the impression that there is plenty of village 
land and underplays the extent of conservation enclosures by stating that ‘village land is estimated to be 70 
percent, general land 2 percent and reserved land which includes forest and wildlife sanctuaries is 28 
percent’ (URT, 2016a, p. 19). Such misleading statistics become even more problematic if we also consider 
the many more WMAs that are currently planned across Tanzania21. If realized, Tanzania could claim to 
protect 50 % or more of its terrestrial area in the name of conservation and tourism22. We do not think that 
all WMAs will be implemented as envisioned due to a) local resistance (e.g. Loliondo and Simanjiro), b) lack 
of investment interest (in most southern and western areas), or c) too ambitious spatial planning (e.g. Lake 
Natron). However, the planning process in itself raises serious concerns over land alienation (Gardner, 
                                                          
20 There is no single accurate dataset of protected areas in Tanzania, but different organizations keep their own 
records, which they sometimes share with each other. Because many protected areas are in the process of being 
upgraded or resurveyed, or their boundaries remain poorly known to conservation authorities, any available datasets 
can show only an outdated, incomplete and inaccurate snapshot. To counter this, in Table 3 we provide a spatial range 
of the total amount of land that is likely claimed for conservation. Our estimate builds on the World Database on 
Protected Areas (WDPA, accessed 2017.01.11) and improves it by avoiding double counting and by including a number 
of known protected areas that are missing in WDPA. WDPA shows an area of around 361,000 km2 under different 
forms of protection, yet it includes double counting, its WMA coverage is incomplete, and CBFM areas are entirely 
excluded. 
21 Different sources suggest a total of 38 or 39 WMAs to be eventually established on 125,000 - 136,714 km2 
(Sosovele, 2015; Mayeta, 2016) 
22 An accurate estimate is impossible, because some WMAs would replace some of the existent GCAs 
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2012). It is due to such contestations around planning and territorial claims in the name of conservation, 
that we do not provide one fixed estimate for total land under conservation, but rather offer a 
corroborated estimate on the spatial extent of conservation claims. The widespread and vast boundary 
uncertainties, overlaps and discrepancies among different data sources constitute a major driver of land 
conflicts, as rural communities have little say over the maps that prescribe whether  people’s actions and 
resident status are lawful or not (Bluwstein & Lund, 2018). 
[Figure 4 here] 
Figure 4: Conservation territories in Tanzania. GIS shapefiles sourced from the recent WDPA dataset (see 
Table 3) and several known protected areas that are missing in WDPA (7 GRs, 4 WMAs, 1 FR; source: WWF 
& TAWIRI shapefiles). CBFM is not mapped for lack of geodata.
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[Table 3 here, landscape format if necessary]   
TABLE 3: Territories under different forms of conservation in Tanzania23 
                                                          
23 T: Tourism allowed. L: Local Livelihoods fully prohibited. na: not available 
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THE INTERLOCKING NATURE OF MULTIPLE DRIVERS OF LAND 
ALIENATION 
Many current land tenure conflicts are remnants of past processes of land alienation (Nelson, Sulle, & 
Lekaita, 2012; Sundet, 1997; URT, 1994). With the onset of colonial rule, agro-pastoral communities saw 
their territories diminished by land reservations and commercial agriculture, and were forced into less 
fertile territories with a lack of water resources for agricultural and livestock production (Neumann, 1998; 
Hodgson, 2001). Colonial land alienation gave way to policies of post-colonial villagization through 
resettlement and the nationalization of land through parastatals in the 1970s (Sundet, 1997; Shivji, 1998). 
Land alienation policies were again reconfigured during the transition from post-colonial socialism towards 
liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, when large swaths of communal lands were appropriated for 
agriculture, tourism and mining (Igoe & Brockington, 1999; Richter, 1994; URT, 1994).  
The history of dispossession is as complex as it is contested. For instance, large-scale agricultural 
investments through parastatals such as the National Food and Agricultural Corporation (NAFCO) displaced 
many smallholders and pastoralists. Later these people would be blamed for ’invading‘ alienated lands 
(Chachage & Mbunda, 2009). After many parastatal companies had been dismantled and privatized by the 
late 1990s/2000s, the lands that remained without claimants were re-appropriated by farmers or 
pastoralists. In some cases, people would advance their land claims in the form of customary rights of 
occupancy under adverse possession according to the Village Land Act 1999, having used abandoned land 
for more than 12 years. However, their claims and land rights have often not been recognized formally 
(Chachage & Mbunda, 2009) and years later new investors would purchase the contested lands by paying 
the former - officially recognized - owners, and attempting to evict the farmers or pastoralists. Examples 
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are a sugar plantation in Bagamoyo (Chung, 2017), a rice plantation in Kilombero (Maganga et al., 2016), 
and a tourism lodge and investment in Loliondo (Gardner, 2016).  
The case of Kilombero is particularly insightful in illustrating how multiple and intersecting authoritative 
claims to land can converge into a powerful bulwark against the most vulnerable and marginalized groups. 
In 2006-7 the government evicted thousands of pastoralists from the Usangu wetlands that were then 
incorporated into the Ruaha National Park. At least 15 villages had to be ‘moved’ to make space for the 
park. According to Walsh (2012, p. 323), the expansion of the park was pushed by a small group of well-
connected tourism investors that effectively lobbied the central government to evict pastoralists by 
‘disseminating the degradation narratives and fuelling the environmental panic’. Many of the displaced 
people and their livestock ended up in the Kilombero valley. Kilombero had already been designated a 
Game Controlled Area (GCA) and a Ramsar site under the international Wetland Convention24. Backed by 
the 2009 Wildlife Conservation Act, which introduced stringent restrictions on human activities in Game 
Controlled Areas, the state-run research institute TAWIRI25 concluded that cultivation and settlement - 51.4 
% of land use in the Kilombero valley in 2009 - were ‘incompatible’ with the GCA designation (TAWIRI, 
2011, cited in URT, 2013b). Within the scope of Ramsar, 29 villages in the Kilombero and Ulanga districts 
had to prepare restrictive village land use plans (Axberg et al., 2011; Greco, 2016) that in 2011-12 
culminated in evictions in line with the 2009 Wildlife Conservation Act (URT, 2013b). Soon thereafter, in 
2013, the international consulting firm ERM conducted environmental and social impact studies for 
SAGCOT in, among other places, the Kilombero valley (ERM, 2013; URT, 2013b). With reference to the 
earlier TAWIRI report, ERM highlighted how ‘the designation of the floodplain and surrounding areas as a 
                                                          
24 Ramsar sites are managed by the Wildlife Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Ramsar sites 
overlap with village lands, Game Controlled Areas, Game Reserves and Forest Reserves, lakes and Marine Parks, 
representing an additional layer of land and water protection against subsistence use (see Table 3, Figure 4) 
25 Tanzania’s Wildlife Research Institute 
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Game Controlled Area, and also as a Ramsar Site, has seemingly had very little deterrent effect on 
encroachment’ (URT, 2013b, p. 163). ERM staff also pointed out that efforts to evict pastoralists from 
Kilombero were not accompanied by a plan to identify an alternative location for the displaced (ERM, 
2013). The most recent report on vulnerable groups and social impacts of SAGCOT - issued by the Prime 
Minister’s office in 2016 - omitted any references to Usangu evictions as reasons for immigration into 
Kilombero, and it failed to include the recent evictions from Kilombero (URT, 2016b). The same year, 
repeated calls to protect the ‘national heritage’ against ‘invaders’ were issued by regional government 
authorities (Guardian, 2016a).  
Another prominent case of the interlocking nature of land alienation centres around the plight of Barabaig 
pastoralists, whose homeland in Hanang District was appropriated by a Canadian-Tanzanian wheat 
investment scheme in the 1980s and ’90s (Lane, 1994). The Barabaig have, since then, struggled to find 
other lands for livestock grazing and watering. In response to land alienation, some Barabaig have settled in 
neighbouring Babati District close to Lake Manyara, where their resident status is currently challenged by a 
European ecotourism investor and a village government in the context of community-based conservation, 
known as Burunge Wildlife Management Area (Bluwstein, 2017). Other Barabaig migrated to Bagamoyo 
District, where a Swedish company was promised land for sugar cane production in 2006. Years before the 
official allocation of 20,000 ha to the company in 2013, this investment intensified conflicts among 
Barabaig pastoralists, other pastoral groups and farmers present in the area. Eventually, the investment has 
stalled and failed to plant any sugar cane. In November 2016 the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human 
Settlements Development revoked the investor’s title deed. This exemplifies that deals that do not 
materialize and fail to produce, can also lead to land alienation (Chung, 2017). In another and similar case, 
both farmers and immigrant Sukuma pastoralists were dispossessed of land and water access due to a 
stalled biofuel-food investment project in Kigoma (Engström, 2013). 
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Yet another example illustrates the historical amnesia by conservationists who often perceive people living 
adjacent to protected areas as a threat, with little regard to histories of dispossession and land alienation 
that contribute to migration and land conversion to agriculture. Markus Borner, the former director of 
Frankfurt Zoological Society, a prominent German conservation NGO, published an influential paper in 1985 
suggesting that due to human activities such as agriculture taking place around Tarangire National Park in 
Northern Tanzania, Tarangire is becoming an ‘isolated “island” park’ for resident species only (Borner, 
1985, p. 91). Some of the land conversion to agriculture was due to immigration of displaced farmers from 
the slopes of Mount Meru and Kilimanjaro to make space for European coffee plantations and national 
parks (Igoe, 2008). Regardless, Borner recommended to ban agriculture across 6,000 km2 around the park 
and to destock the Maasai. Thus, previous dispossession and land alienation taking place hundreds of 
kilometres away (around Meru and Kilimanjaro) created, years later, new justifications for land control and 
alienation in a new area (around Tarangire). 
We have not touched upon land alienation in the wake of the establishment of refugee camps. However, as 
recently as in 2000, Tanzania hosted the largest population of refugees on the African continent with over 
680,000 people from DRC, Burundi and Rwanda.26 Refugee camps were established across Kigoma and 
Kagera regions on land that was in most cases acquired from villages and converted into general land. 
Camps operated by the UNHCR have all resulted in land loss to local communities and were not returned to 
the villagers even after most camps were eventually shut down (although recently some had to reopen due 
to the continuing conflict in Burundi). More research is needed to better determine the extent of land 
alienation in these cases. 
                                                          
26 “Tanzanian refugee numbers drops below 100,000: UN,” UNHCR/REFDAILY, 29 Nov 2009. Accessed at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=52fc6fbd5&id=4b13767b5. Also “Tanzania opens new camps 
for Burundian refugees to ease conditions in Nyarugusu Camp,” UNHCR, 7 Oct 2015. Accessed at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/56153da96.html 
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In response to dispossession, many pastoralists and farmers diversify their income sources, continue 
migrating to other parts of the country, or turn to urban areas in search for wage labour (McCabe et al., 
2014; May & Ikayo, 2007; Nyenza, Nzunda, & Katani, 2013). However, the nascent formal labour market in 
Tanzania absorbs only a fraction of those searching for work (Wuyts & Kilama, 2016). The growing tensions 
between farmers and pastoralists, pastoralists and conservationists, or farmers and conservationists are 
exemplifying this development. To what degree are human population growth and migration intertwined 
with the processes of land alienation and associated land conflicts that we have illustrated so far? Given the 
population projections as previously discussed, most Tanzanians will continue to depend on land as their 
primary means of (re)production due to lack of alternatives, although making a living in rural areas is 
becoming increasingly difficult for many (Coulson, 2013; Patnaik & Moyo, 2011). Coulson (2013) suggests 
that two opposing processes take place in Tanzania in parallel (and may be spatially unevenly distributed) 
and will likely decide the future of Tanzania’ peasantry: on one hand agricultural innovation can to some 
degree counteract population growth and a decreasing land availability (see Boserup, 1965), while on the 
other hand deagrarianization (see Bryceson’s work) is another response to decreasing land availability and 
reduced agricultural productivity. While it is difficult to pass a definite judgement on which of the two 
processes currently prevails, rural-urban and rural-rural migration dynamics and widespread land conflicts 
suggest that, in a context of projected population growth and a jobless economic growth, an increasingly 
land-deprived peasantry will suffer growing hardship in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to claims of unused land, we assert that the overall land pressure in Tanzania has increased 
substantially over the past 1-2 decades. Reinforced by continual land dependency of the rural population, 
population growth and increasing social differentiation, this development is a consequence of Tanzania’s 
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embracement of neoliberal policies to attract, enable and facilitate foreign and domestic investment for 
conservation and tourism, mining and agriculture. Historical and present data on land under conservation, 
medium- or large-scale agriculture, and mining are incomplete and to some extent ambiguous. Moreover, 
many land tenure reconfigurations that we describe cannot be simply conceptualized, measured, and 
counted as physical land grabs. Rather, the rush to land use planning and titling, and pastoral and labour 
migration patterns are indicators of often indirectly experienced effects of an ongoing and incomplete 
primitive accumulation. Accumulation by dispossession takes many forms. It may result in a complete 
alienation of land, or it may also present itself in the form of restrictions on the uses of land as a means of 
production. The processes underlying land alienation are underpinned by uneven power relations that 
particularly affect poor and female-headed households pertaining to land access and resource control. The 
effects further extend into the patriarchal household, leading to a locally specific and a priori unpredictable 
re-negotiation of gender roles and relations in the wake of commercial agriculture, mining or conservation 
interventions (Chung, 2017; Bryceson & Jønsson, 2010; Brockington, 2002). Of course, land tenure 
reconfigurations do not go unchallenged as some examples of failed investments in large-scale agriculture 
or stalled implementations of wildlife management areas or hunting concessions demonstrate. 
While the localized effects of all these reconfigurations are geographically contingent, unevenly distributed 
and not always associated with foreign investment, they jointly contribute further to a growing land 
pressure in Tanzania. As shown in this article, exclusive attention to foreign investment or a particular 
sector (such as agriculture) would unnecessarily narrow the analysis. Instead, an aggregated view across 
sectors, actors, institutions, time and scales is needed to appreciate the interlocking nature of different 
processes of land alienation. The ongoing scramble for land that we see unravelling in Tanzania pushes 
land-dependent yet land-deprived people to respond in ways that to many only at face value look like 
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voluntary choices, but can further undermine the conditions of land-based reproduction27. Local processes 
of land alienation mutually reinforce one another, amplifying land tenure reconfigurations that at an 
aggregate scale mean growing land pressure overall. With these various processes jointly contributing to a 
scramble for land that is felt in many localities across Tanzania, we can begin to see a ‘simple reproduction 
squeeze’ (Bernstein, 1977), whereby the most vulnerable groups - rural poor, migrants, women, youth, 
pastoralists - find it increasingly difficult to maintain or increase their consumption and production. This 
may, in turn, lend support to claims that rural livelihoods are less productive than large-scale investments, 
thereby further entrenching the arguments for land tenure changes that adversely affect vulnerable 
smallholders, who become increasingly trapped between land dependence and land deprivation. 
Ultimately, official policy objectives of poverty alleviation and inclusive development through land use 
planning, land tenure formalization, agricultural commercialization, mineral extraction and community-
based conservation and tourism will fail, as long Tanzania’s political economy advances an uneven 
development through land alienation. 
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